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Two years ago, the dispute resolution world was set reeling by the
release of the long-anticipated Rand Corporation report on mediation and
neutral evaluation in the federal courts.1 That study concluded that there
was "no strong statistical evidence that time to disposition [or lawyer work
hours were] significantly affected by mediation or neutral evaluation in any
of the six programs studied." 2 In fact, these findings were not at all
inconsistent with the mixed results shown by the limited research about
civil case mediation in state courts. 3 Nonetheless, this report generated
* Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University College of
Law, delivered April 15, 1998.
** Craig A. McEwen is the Daniel B. Fayerweather Professor of Political Economy
and Sociology at Bowdoin College. My thanks to the six corporations which agreed to
participate in the research reported here. That research was supported by grants from
the National Science Foundation's Law and Social Sciences Program to Bowdoin
College (SBR-9224321) and The Ohio State University (SBR-9224332) as well as from
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. Thanks to Bonnie Pietsch who provided
invaluable assistance in preparing this manuscript, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow and the
Law and Society Seminar participants at Georgetown University Law School who
reacted to an early draft of the ideas in this Article, and to Nancy Rogers and Stevens
Clarke for helpful comments on a draft manuscript. The analysis in this Article is that
of the author alone and does not reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or
the Hewlett Foundation.
1 See JAMES S. KAKALiK Fr AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EvALUATION UNDER THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT at xxvii (1996).
2 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 2, at xxx.
3 Some studies of civil mediation suggest reductions in time and costs through
mediation. See STvENS H. CLARKE ET AL., COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS at vii (1995); JUUE
MACFARLANE, COURT-BASED MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES: AN EVALUATION OF THE
ONTARIO COURT (GENERAL DiviSION) ADR CENTRE 13, 17, 35 (1995); Susan Keilitz,
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fierce debate between the Rand researchers and defenders of mediation who
were concerned about the policy effects of these conclusions which
suggested that mediation "didn't work. "4
According to the mediation defenders, the programs studied were not
representative of those in federal courts;5 they were poorly implemented
examples of mediation; 6 they were studied in their early stages before
improvements were implemented;7 and the research too narrowly construed
the impact of mediation, focusing primarily on time and cost rather than on
the less tangible benefits relating to quality and party satisfaction. 8 The
exchanges between Rand researchers and mediation defenders raised blood
pressure levels, and consumed pages of print, but left unresolved the
question of whether civil case mediation works to affect the timing, cost,
and quality of case resolution.
In this Article, I will use evidence from a study of the varying ways
that corporations manage business-to-business disputes to argue that this
debate between mediation defenders and researchers does not focus on the
Civil Dispute Resolution Processes, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIuM ON COURT-CONNECTED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH: A REPORT ON RECENT RESEARCH FINDINGS-
IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 1, 8-9 (Susan Keilitz ed.,
1993). Research also documents high party satisfaction. See MACFARLANE, supra, at
47-48; Keilitz, supra, at 9. Other research results are not so promising. See CLARKE ET
AL., supra, at vi-vii; Stevens H. Clarke & Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship
of Private Settling: Court-Ordered Civil Case Mediation, 19 JUST. Sys. J. 311, 311
(1997); Keilitz, supra, at 7-9.
4 See Pamela Chapman Enslen, Insights on Participant Satisfaction May Be Real
Significance of RAND Report, 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 14 (1997); Deborah R. Hensler,
Rand's Rebuttal: CJRA Study Results Reflect Court ADR Usage-Not Perceptions, 15
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 79 (1997); Sanford M. Jaffe & Linda Stamato,
Views on Rand's CJRA Report: No Short Cuts to Justice, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 67 (1997); Diane E. Kenty, RAND Report Provides Insights for State Court
ADR Programs, 3 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 18 (1997); Jefferey G. Kichaven, ADR Doesn't
Save Time or Money? Great News!, 3 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 15 (1997); Craig A.
McEwen & Elizabeth Plapinger, RAND Report Points Way to Next Generation of ADR
Research, 3 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 10 (1997); Francis E. McGovern, Beyond Efficiency:
A Bevy of ADR Justifications, 3 DIsp. RESOL. MAG. 12 (1997); Kent Snapp, Five Years
of Random Testing Shows Early ADR Successful, 3 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 16 (1997);
Views on Rand's CJRA Report: Concerns and Recommendations, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 67 (1997).
5 See McEwen & Plapinger, supra note 4, at 10.
6 See id.
7 See Enslen, supra note 4, at 14.
8 See Enslen, supra note 4, at 14; Jaffe & Stamato, supra note 4, at 68; Kenty,
supra note 4, at 18; Kichaven, supra note 4, at 15; McGovern, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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right issues. Instead of asking whether mediation works or not, we need to
examine how and why parties and lawyers "work" mediation in varying
ways. Asking the second question rather than the first would refocus the
conclusions from the Rand research. What if the press release summarizing
that study had said, "Lawyers and parties in federal courts fail to make
effective use of mediation and early neutral evaluation to speed resolution
and reduce costs"? This perspective on mediation reflects the presumption
that it is a process that the parties and their lawyers control in many ways.
As a result, it follows that parties and lawyers have considerable
responsibility for the impact of mediation on the costs and the timing of
events in civil litigation and for the character and quality of the results it
produces.
Once said, the importance of lawyers and parties to mediation seems
pretty obvious. Certainly, it was readily apparent to one of the corporate
counsel we interviewed in research that I will describe later in this Article.
As he put it:
Mediation in and of itself is not going to reduce costs or time. You could
go back and forth for years and then go into mediation. Or you could go
into mediation immediately. It's everything that happens around mediation
that makes it more or less expensive.... Mediation itself, sitting in a
room with a so-called neutral third party, is no panacea.9
In this view, mediation is a tool. Its effects depend on its uses and on the
skills, goals, and orientations of its users. 10
9 Corporate Study, infra note 13.
10 This view of mediation has been at least implicit in commentary raising concerns
about the engagement in mediation of lawyers who bring to it their "adversarial
orientation." From this perspective, lawyers can transform the mediation process from
imaginative problem solving to extensions of litigation in which winning is the
objective. Thus, the orientations of lawyers and parties to mediation shape how it is
employed. See generally Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging
the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
REv. 1317, 1354 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1, 13 (1998). Further, there is research noting how little the introduction of
mediation changes the ways that lawyers approach the practice of law. Clarke and
Gordon note, for example, that the introduction of civil case mediation in North
Carolina courts "did not substantially alter the way [lawyers] practiced law ....
Remarkably, a majority (55 percent) reported that mediation did not change their
approach to settlement negotiation." Clarke & Gordon, supra note 3, at 332.
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The effects that preoccupied this lawyer and that were the focus of the
Rand analysis were those relating to the cost and timeliness of resolution,
even though many in the mediation world have come to believe they are
secondary at best to concerns about the quality of process and outcome.11
In business-to-business disputing, however, time and cost appear to be
tightly interwoven with issues of quality.12 Longer, costlier processes grow
out of the same approaches to disputes that arguably produce lower quality
outcomes (e.g., less imaginative and more threatening to business
relationships). Time and cost, thus, can be viewed as important indicators
of underlying approaches to disputing that shape quality outcomes as well.
In the corporate context, these underlying approaches turn out to involve
the ways that businesses organize themselves to deal with disputes, not just
their willingness to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in general or
mediation in particular. This Article describes differing degrees to which
businesses manage disputing and thus put mediation to use in varying ways
with varying effects on time, cost, and quality.
I. CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This study of corporate disputing comes from a research project that
was supported by the National Science Foundation and conducted some
years ago with colleagues at Ohio State- Professors Nancy Rogers, Philip
Sorensen, and Richard Klimoski, and effectively managed by graduate
student Mary Courtney. It examined the ways in which six very large
corporations resolved their disputes with other businesses. In this research,
we interviewed in-house counsel and business executives about disputes and
disputing and gathered evidence from documents and interviews about
roughly 170 business-to-business disputes.13
I1 See sources cited supra note 8.
12 See John Lande, Relationships Drive Support for Mediation, 15 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH CosT LITG. 95, 96-97 (1997).
13 In the research [hereinafter Corporate Study], the six companies agreed to
varying degrees to share case documents and permit law/graduate students access to
legal staff and business personnel for interviews with the understanding that the
researchers would not divulge the identities of the companies studied or release the
qualitative data gathered to others. During 1993-1995, the principal investigators and
law and graduate student research assistants interviewed general counsel, conducted
written surveys of legal staff, and gathered documentary evidence and information
through open-ended interviews on roughly 30 business-to-business disputes for each
company. The quotations in this article come from field notes collected during the
course of that study. At times these notes have been edited slightly for sake of clarity.
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The six companies that we studied were selected to reflect the range of
approaches to dispute resolution that we understood to exist among large
businesses in the United States. Two of the companies we selected rarely or
never initiated ADR, two employed it occasionally and expressed interest in
it, and two appeared strongly committed to using ADR, especially
mediation. This variation reflected the widely held view that what really
matters in differentiating companies is the extent to which they use ADR. 14
The Center for Public Resources (CPR) Institute for Dispute Resolution,
for example, has had as a central mission the promotion of the CPR Pledge
to employ ADR in disputes with other businesses. 15 Five of the six
companies we studied were signatories. More particularly, however, this
variation reflected the researchers' assumption that the extent of use of
mediation, not of other ADR processes, provided a more meaningful way
of distinguishing companies. 16
Our research results challenged this assumption, however, by
suggesting that the most consequential differences among companies lie
deeper than either signing or not signing the CPR Pledge or using
mediation heavily, some, or not at all. These differences involved variation
in what I will call the "management of disputing," and they seemed to be
closely linked to the time, cost, and quality of dispute resolution. By
management of disputing I mean a systematic assessment of the ways that a
corporation produces, prevents, and processes disputes; coordinated efforts
to achieve clear goals related to dispute prevention and processing; and
careful monitoring of the achievement of those goals. Such management
means that disputes are not viewed as exceptional events to be handled on a
case-by-case basis, but rather are seen as regular occurrences that can and
should be managed to achieve wider organizational objectives.
In business-to-business disputes involving large corporations,
maintaining relationships, controlling costs, and limiting the duration of
14 See Briefs: Survey #1: ADR Use Is Rising, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 85, 85 (1997). For a general description of the three stages of the development of
corporate dispute resolution, see Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:
Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REv. 847, 859-878 (1996).
15 See Cronin-Harris, supra note 14, at 862; Pledges Encourage ADR Use, Cost
Savings, 15 ALTERNATIVS TO HIGH COsT LrriG. 88, 89 (1997).
16 The crucial distinctions to the research team were between mediation and other
processes that are generally designed to be like adjudication (arbitration) or to predict
outcomes in adjudication as a tool for inducing settlement. See Craig A. McEwen,
Pursuing Problem-Solving or Predictive Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 77, 87-88
(1991).
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conflicts all seem to matter to managers and to lawyers. 17 But these
concerns get translated into practice in highly variable ways having to do
with the extent to which the management of disputing is organized and
rationalized.1s Thus, my reading of the data from the six companies
suggests the following hypothesis: Where the management of disputing is
weak or inconsistent, costs appear higher, disputes longer, and
relationships in greater jeopardy, but where that management is coherent,
strong, and oriented to reasonable settlement, costs are likely to be lower,
disputes shorter, and relationships more often preserved. 19 Deployment of
mediation is only one part of the enterprise of managing disputes, and the
effects of its use on such factors as time and cost depend largely on the
degree to which other aspects of disputing management are or are not in
place. At the same time, the perspective on disputing that mediation can
provide parties has the potential to promote effective management that
makes resolution faster, less expensive, and of higher quality.
Where the management of disputing is well developed, companies
undertake a careful assessment of and coordinated effort to address the
widely shared problems businesses face in dealing with disputes. Where the
management of disputing is weak, these problems fester, are unexamined,
or are taken for granted as inevitable parts of the corporate disputing
landscape. Before examining in detail what the management of disputing
entails, let us review some of the common problems corporations face in
handling disputes.
II. COMMON CHALLENGES OF DISPUTING IN THE CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENT
Unlike most individuals, but similar to government agencies and other
large organizations, big businesses regularly find themselves embroiled in
conflicts. The experience of disputes thus is commonly shared across
businesses, even if their approaches to dealing with them vary
considerably. The business people and lawyers in the companies that we
17 See Lande, supra note 12, at 96-97.
18 Catherine Cronin-Harris suggests that corporate disputing is just beginning to
enter a third stage characterized by "systems design." See Cronin-Harris, supra note
14, at 873. What I call management of disputing fits into this third stage of
development.
19 Because this hypothesis was derived from the study reported here, the evidence
from that study does not serve to "prove" the hypothesis, only to illustrate it.
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studied differed little in their perceptions of the problems they face in
responding to these disputes.
First, they generally shared worries about the costs of disputing
through litigation and the challenge of bringing those costs under control. 20
These concerns were especially understandable given reports of rapidly
escalating legal expenses in recent years. For example, one company
reported a nine-fold increase in legal costs over the ten years prior to the
study while another reported a ten-fold increase. 21 Pressures within
businesses to reduce expenditures make large cost centers vulnerable to
controls. In the words of one general counsel, "The legal department is
seen as part of overhead, as part of maintaining the headquarters facility,
and so, it is seen as something that is not directly related to productivity
and could/should be cut back in costs." 22
In one company a management consultant had examined legal costs and
concluded that transaction costs-the expenses associated with pursuing or
defending a legal claim- amounted to two to three times the costs of
settlements and judgments paid out.23 We do not know whether such ratios
apply to all companies, but counsel agreed generally on the major sources
of the transaction costs that their companies faced in resolving conflicts
through litigation: outside counsel, discovery, and management time.24
These companies, like many others,25 were increasingly attentive to the
expense of outside counsel and were trying in varying degrees to control
those costs. One inside counsel noted that "[c]osts and time are always an
issue in any dispute, but the most important factor in cost is outside counsel
20 These concerns are widely shared among corporate counsel. See Curtis H.
Barnette, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reducing Litigation Costs
as a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTrrRUSr L.J. 277, 277-278 (1984); The Corporate
Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Legal Development: Report on Cost-
Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REv. 263, 265 (1995).
21 See Corporate Study, supra note 13.
22 Id.
23 See Corporate Study, supra note 13. Robert Kenagy reports similar findings in a
study of the transaction costs of subrogation claims between Whirlpool and State Farm.
See Robert T. Kenagy, Whirlpool's Search for Efficient and Effective Dispute
Resolution, 59 ALB. L. REv. 895, 898 (1996).
24 See also the emphasis of one corporate counsel on streamlined discovery,
eliminating expenditures on outside counsel, and tighter deadlines. See Kenagy, supra
note 23, at 898.
25 See The Corporate Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 20,
at 265.
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fees." 26 A lawyer in another company cited the results of the earlier-noted
consultant's study of litigation costs:
As a result of the consultant's study we are very concerned about the costs
of disputes, especially outside counsel because "most of the costs are
there." . . . Outside counsel must clear everything they do with the inside
attorney. This was always the policy but now it is being enforced. There is
also a push to reduce outside lawyer time in research, reduce partner time,
and a big push to do more in house. 27
This business was much more aggressive than some of the others in finding
ways to reduce outside counsel fees, but all recognized the problem.
A significant element of the costs of outside counsel and of the
litigation process generally was seen to result from discovery which, in
turn, played a major role in imposing burdensome demands on business
people. 28 As one lawyer put it, "The number one cost item is depositions.
And this has many aspects to it. For example, how many representatives do
we send to a deposition? Who reviews the documents? The more lawyers,
managers, and expert witnesses involved, the more expensive the case
gets."' 29 This attorney focused on discovery but also hinted at hidden costs
of litigation resulting from the commitment of management time to
handling disputes. These costs were a central issue for other counsel: "The
greatest costs of disputing are management time. The effort that goes into it
is almost immeasurable. Whenever management is involved in disputing,
we are eating into our profits."' 30 "The most important issue in disputing
between corporations is the drain on resources to resolve the dispute. The
truth is, even if it costs $1 million no one will say 'Oh my god!' It is the
drain on people's time-that is more important than the money." 31 The
26 Corporate Study, supra note 13.
27 Id.
28 "Because most cases are settled and not tried, much of the expense of litigation
is attributable to discovery." The Corporate Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, supra note 20, at 312. These concerns about the "expense and delay" of
discovery echo throughout a recent symposium on innovations in discovery directed at
efforts to alter both the rules and practices of discovery. See Alex W. Albright,
Introduction to Symposium on Innovations in Discovery, 16 REv. LrrG. 249, 251
(1997).





serious impact of extended litigation on management was one of the central
reasons to try to find speedier resolutions to disputes.
In order to reduce the strain on business managers and control costs, it
was clear to lawyers in at least four of the companies studied that reducing
the time to resolution of disputes was an important objective. 32 One general
counsel observed, for example, that "[w]e like to nip cases in the bud." 33
According to another, "Our company has always attempted early
settlement. People act like this is a big discovery. Where have they
been?" 34 Despite this lawyer's belief that the conclusion about the value of
early settlement was obvious, it was reported in another company as the
"biggest idea to come out of' their consultant's report on legal costs noted
earlier. 35
III. BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING FASTER, LESS COSTLY, AND HIGHER
QUALITY RESOLUTION OF BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS DISPUTES
Unfortunately, identifyring costs turned out to be easier than controlling
them, just as embracing early settlement proved simpler than achieving
faster resolutions of disputes. Although the lawyers we interviewed
generally shared a similar understanding of the symptoms of the problems
they faced, they were far less clear about the forces producing those
symptoms, thus making their cure difficult. The interviews suggest,
however, four major factors that seemed to create barriers to achieving
faster and less costly resolution of disputes- contentious corporate cultures,
the emotional investment of managers in disputes, misalignment of
incentives for managers and outside lawyers, and what we might call the
professional culture of lawyers.
Contentious and competitive corporate cultures could both encourage
disputes in the first place and get in the way of their efficient resolution. 36
Such cultures help to make popular negotiation seminars like those on
"How to Win at Negotiation" or "How to Be a 'Tough-as-Nails'
32 "Sometimes the most cost-effective management of litigation consists of settling
the litigation before its cost becomes excessive." The Corporate Counsel Section of the
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 20, at 295.
33 Corporate Study, supra note 13.
341d.
35 Id.
36 For a general analysis of corporate cultures and the ways that they play out in
internal disputing, see CALVIN MORRILL, THE EXECUTIVE WAY: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATIONS (1995).
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Negotiator." 37 For example, according to the chief litigator, the "tough
guy" culture at a business unit of one company generated disputes-often
with business customers- and prompted litigation with the company as a
defendant. 38 The general counsel in another company noted, "We're the
defendant almost all of the time. Our business people think that they're
right all the time. We [lawyers] need to separate emotion from fact." 39
Another observed that "[w]e might be the plaintiff more frequently if it
were left at the district manager level, but not when management looks at
the overall picture." 40 Scrappy, competitive business cultures appear to
encourage disputing and get in the way of efforts to settle cases.
Individual managers also became personally invested in disputes in
ways that made settlement harder and often diverged from the larger
interests of the corporation. This was particularly likely, according to one
general counsel, "[e]specially when there is emotion, if they think they've
been wronged. We've had our share of experience with executives digging
their heels in." 41 Another lawyer noted that:
The most difficult thing for us here is to get managers to cool off and back
down. It's the lawyers who emphasize the need to settle. The lawyers are
pragmatists. So we pursue what is most reasonable and fastest. The
lawyers try to separate the emotional issues, the egos involved, and the
facts of the case. The lawyers would like the facts to prevail, but often
emotion takes over. So in hindsight it may not look like they took the best
route, but at the time, it was the most reasonable path available given the
personalities involved. [The handling of business disputes] is a lot of
politics. 42
This lawyer describes the practical realities that corporate counsel face in
having to depart from preferred methods of approaching cases in order to
respond to the personalities, politics, and cultures of their client
organizations, but not all counsel felt powerless to change these features of
the corporate landscape.
The problems of contentious corporate cultures and personally invested
clients could be reinforced by a set of incentives that encouraged litigation
37 See, e.g., Briefs: Napalm Negotiation Tactics, 15 ALTERNATIvES TO HIGH COST
LiTIG. 116, 116 (1997).







and delayed settlement. For example, the costs of lawyer time (both outside
counsel and inside lawyers) were often borne by the corporation as a
whole, while the costs of settlements or judgments typically came out of the
budgets of the business units engaged in disputes. The consequences were
predictable:
Settlements come off the bottom line of the divisions. That is precisely the
reason management wants to fight. They hold out the hope that they will
win and not have to pay a settlement. And the costs of the legal
department are overhead that do not come off any division's bottom
line.... So whatever we [the lawyers] can do is to stall.4 3
With such an incentive structure, it was not surprising that managers
wanted to pursue disputes aggressively and to delay the pay out or to
reduce it, no matter what the transaction costs to the company as a whole.
The incentives for outside counsel in litigation were also perceived as
inconsistent with efforts to settle early and cheaply. One general counsel
observed:
Another problem is the diametrically opposed interests of outside counsel
with those of their clients. The hourly billing rate is the villain. It is in the
best interest of lawyers to do things slowly. The word settlement strikes
fear throughout the entire body of a private law firm lawyer. With a client
wanting... high quality and priority to early settlement and appropriate
use of ADR at the earliest possible time and to do so in as few hours as
possible, the law firm is in conflict with the client.44
From his perspective, these incentives remained in place because inside
counsel had not been sufficiently imaginative or motivated to change the
accustomed way of doing business.45 "The real villain is the in house
43 Id.
44Id.
45 One of the potential opportunities for changing incentives for outside counsel
was by altering billing arrangements. This general counsel observed that "[w]e are at
the leading edge of alternative billing. But if you imagine movement toward a better
billing arrangement on a scale of 1 to 100, we have just gotten to 1. The concept of risk
sharing is at center of the venture." Id. See the growing literature on alternative billing,
for example: The Corporate Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note
20, at 285-287. See also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Billing Reform Initiatives, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 963 (1996); Jeffrey M. Rubin & Melissa G. Thompson, An Overvieiv of
Alternative Billing Practices, 6 PRACTICAL LITIGATOR 75 (1995); Legal Billing: Seeking
Alternatives to the Hourly Rate, 77 JUDICATURE 186 (1994).
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counsel who has failed to look for alternatives. They have a comfort level
with the hourly rate system which they understand. But outside counsel
takes no risks. Whether they win or lose, go fast or slow, they get paid by
the hour." 46 In companies, thus, where the economic incentives of
managers were to litigate and delay, and of outside counsel were to proceed
cautiously, the likelihood of speedy settlement seemed especially remote.
The professional culture of lawyers could also work against low cost
and rapid resolution of disputes. 47 A significant aspect of that culture has to
do with expectations regarding the extent of information required before
rendering advice about how to proceed with a case. The preference to
maximize that information promotes heavy reliance on discovery. One
attorney, for example, commented on the importance of discovery in the
culture of American lawyers:
Arbitration and mediation would be better than litigation only if you
eliminated discovery because that is where the costs are. But in the U.S.
the use of discovery will never diminish because it's tradition. It's the way
we've done things. We don't want to deal at a disadvantage with our
opponent. They're going to get the facts, so we have to, too. [When asked
if management said to reduce discovery:] I would tell them that they were
taking a big risk to cut discovery.48
Given this powerful professional culture, it is not surprising to hear of
attorney resistance to the recommendation of the management consultants
who had studied legal costs and recommended speedy settlement. "Early
settlement is disputed as a good idea by some of our legal staff because
some argue that you cannot settle until you know all the facts." 49 A lawyer
in another company identified the same tension: "The biggest cost issue in
disputing is getting an early settlement. But having said that, there are
situations where we have to have options or facts regarding the case and in
these situations, we are not concerned about early settlement." 50 Thus, the
obvious solutions to problems of cost and delay were not easy solutions,
46 Corporate Study, supra note 13.
47 See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the
Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 831, 842 (1998) (discussing lawyers' hesitation to use mediation before
the completion of formal discovery).





and lawyers for a wide range of reasons tended to continue practice as
usual.
One perceptive business person noted that this pattern of practice as
usual was driven in part by the professional commitment of lawyers to what
they saw as high quality, careful work. In his words "[lawyers] like to do a
good job, which means a ,thorough case, spending money on
depositions. '"51 Informal professional norms about the character of
litigation also affect the pace and cost of resolution because "lawsuits take
on a life of their own." 52 "One lawyer does one thing and the other reacts.
Finally business people say, 'Let's sit down and talk.' [It is not done
earlier] because it's not part of the tactics .... The lawyer will say that the
other side isn't ready, it's not the right time, or something." 53 It is possible
then that tradition and the momentum of litigation practice and the
assumptions of legal professionals about tactics and about the "ripeness" of
cases can also delay settlement and drive up costs.
The case-centered tradition of legal training and practice also plays an
indirect part in raising costs and delaying resolution of disputes. Lawyers
learn to assess each case as unique in relation to the wishes of individual
clients. As one general counsel reported, "We look at each case
individually, fact pattern by fact pattern.54 This view echoes through the
interviews with lawyers in other companies about the ways that they
understood disputes. According to another general counsel, the use of
mediation is evaluated case-by-case, too: "We have to see the merits of a
case to see if it's worth settling. We are pro-ADR in theory but when you
get down to specifics, it's a hard pill to swallow. We haven't seen many
opportunities to use it."'55 This professional orientation toward case-by-case
analysis not only may make attorneys reluctant to adopt mediation in
particular instances, but also may make it more difficult for them to see the
opportunities to take a leadership role in creating and implementing
changed policies and practices for managing disputing generally.
The difficulty of taking a leadership role in managing disputing is
further reinforced by the professional sense that it is clients, not lawyers,
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whether to settle, and the acceptable terms of settlement. 56 In this view,
"Lawyers are there to provide services. It is the client that must decide if
the case is tried or settled. Lawyers cannot always expect management to
follow their advice." ' 57 Or as an attorney put it at another company: "The
business people are completely in charge of the disputes in this company.
Whatever they want is what happens."5 8 One result of the case-by-case,
client-directed orientation is the absence of a clear policy or philosophy
relating to disputes and dispute resolution in general:
There is no corporate philosophy for handling disputes. Each case is
different.... Most disputes are resolved before they get to a fight. Once
it's a fight, then management wants to win. But most disputes are resolved
immediately in the interest of the relationship. Preservation of business
relationships is a management philosophy, not a dispute philosophy, which
is "how do we fight?" 59
In this traditional view of the lawyer's role then, attorneys are advisors and
counselors, not disputing policymakers or managers. The result in most
situations is that although each dispute will be managed in some fashion, no
one in the corporation has the responsibility for managing disputing
generally and systematically.
IV. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS BY MANAGING DISPUTING
The management of disputing in an organization which is regularly
involved in conflict with customers, competitors, vendors, business
partners, contractors, or government agencies is much different from the
management of individual disputes. The latter happens case-by-case. The
former involves an assessment and systematic organization of the ways that
disputes are generally understood, evaluated, and handled in the company.
Management of disputing requires establishing clear objectives in dealing
with disputes, identifying strategies to achieve those objectives, and
56 This view is not inconsistent with the perception that we also heard that lawyers
"take over" disputes from business people once the problems are referred to a legal
department. Indeed, attorneys expected to manage the day-to-day aspects of litigation,
but generally in the context of the direction that they understand had been set by their
clients.





monitoring their achievement. It may require challenging taken-for-granted
practices and changing organizations.
In our observations of the six corporations, we saw one where the
management of disputing was well developed and five where it was less
well developed. What was generally missing in these five was a clear sense
of either organizational goals or of an overall strategy for achieving goals
by managing disputes. Most, however, had adopted piecemeal one or more
methods for dealing with the costs or timing of disputes, but these
innovations had little coherence and, apparently, limited effect. Among the
methods we learned about were the following: stricter management of
outside counsel and increased use of inside counsel,60 education of business
people about the costs and problems of litigation, 61 changed incentives for
disputing by charging back costs of lawyers to business units,62 and, of
course, introduction and promotion of the use of ADR, especially
mediation.63 The introduction of ADR generally or of mediation in
60 For example:
The legal department is currently working on an approved counsel list. The point
of this is to reduce the number of firms they deal with and ultimately, to reduce
fees. We are trying to establish tighter rein on outside counsel, establish a bidding




I interview production guys when they begin a dispute in order to make them
understand the expenses involved in proceeding. They don't realize what's going
on; they think it is going to be out of their hands. They need to know that they will
be spending days pulling documents. It seems like it rarely strikes one executive
twice, so there is always the education process.
Id. Or: "Litigation is pretty ugly these days. Coming to the table can be an eye opener
for management. They think they have a winner; but after they've spent a day
negotiating [they change their minds]." Id.
62 For example:
From a monetary standpoint, settlements come off their bottom line. When we got
into benchmarking, we were surprised to learn that it was a minority position.
Each lawyer here tracks their time [to a division]. Then we take our monthly
budget and allocate the percentage of it to that division based on the percentage of
our total time spent on the case.
Id.
63 For example: "We have a letter that goes to outside counsel that requires that
they use ADR." Id. Or: "[We like to] use ADR clauses. When both parties are
signatories or when they agreed ahead of time, then no one can infer anything about the
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particular, however, like the use of these other techniques, seemed to
change little unless they were done as part of a systematic effort to manage
disputing. Unlike the other techniques, however, mediation provides an
alternative way of thinking about conflicts that in turn could promote the
development and organization of systematic strategies for managing
disputing.
To understand more clearly what the management of disputing
involves, let us take a close look at the company that was most organized in
this respect. For purposes of this Article, I will call that company MOD.
A. The Management of Disputing at MOD
Several key lawyers including the general counsel and the litigators in
MOD took on the role of managers of the disputing process. What led them
to move beyond the case-by-case, client service role that dominated in
other companies and to take the lead in rethinking and redesigning both
corporate and lawyer practices that affected the generation and processing
of disputes? The organizational context matters a great deal here in
explaining the adoption of the disputing management role. As the story is
told, it seems to involve a convergence of several factors. In a company
that was reorganizing itself around notions of Total Quality Management
and increased efficiency and quality in production, the legal division was
challenged to see how it could define in measurable ways its own efficiency
and quality management. Identifying measures for achieving such
objectives could be a difficult problem for a legal department, especially
for its litigators, who more typically look at their work on a case-by-case
basis, balancing the likelihood and nature of possible outcomes in each
dispute against the expense of achieving them while advising clients who
are the final decisionmakers.
In response to these demands for accountability, MOD's legal division
developed a clear organizational mission and set of standards to assess its
own success in achieving that mission. The mission was to maximize
prompt and favorable settlements, and the indicators of success were the
shortness of the duration of disputes, favorable outcomes, cost savings, and
client satisfaction. The principles of alternative dispute resolution,
especially mediation, provided both the theory and much of the strategy for
achieving these goals. Thus, the head of the litigation unit noted that "[t]he
truth is that ADR (and particularly mediation) principles have become so
other party wanting to use ADR. No one wants to make the first move otherwise,
because it makes you seem weak." Id.
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much a part of how we look at each case, that we now very frequently
resolve matters using these principles in negotiations, without the
intervention of a third party neutral." 64 One annual report of the litigators
elaborated on "the principles of our ADR program, i.e., early case
evaluation followed by client consultation followed by early and good faith
'interests-based' negotiation." 65 In a nutshell, then, the corporate dispute
resolution goals at MOD were as follows: "Resolving disputes at the lowest
level through ADR is most cost effective and least disruptive to your
business.... If you fix it earlier and lower, you keep the dollars. This
creates financial incentives for business people to use alternatives to resolve
disputes. "66
One of the annual reports of the litigators at MOD provides a good
picture of the way that they had come to think about the management of
disputing in relation to these objectives. First, that report listed prominent
achievements, including cases won through dismissal and summary
judgment decisions and cases in which "favorable settlements" were
achieved. 67 The report then described in detail all the cases that went to
formal mediation, while noting that at least thirteen others were resolved
through "ADR principles."' 68 It reported on the percentage of cases-over
ninety percent-in which "favorable outcomes" could be claimed. 69 And
then, based on an annual tracking of the amount of time to resolve cases
coming to the litigation section, it reported a reduction in that average from
9.7 months to 7.8 months.70 This reduction is particularly important
because it reflects the objective of settling as many cases as possible in
what was called Stage 1 of a dispute (a stage of internal investigation prior
to formal discovery) or the early steps of Stage 2 (formal discovery). 71 The
results claimed were significant costs savings which were set out in
impressive tables and multi-colored graphs. 72
With such clear objectives guiding their work, the lawyers at MOD
took on the responsibility of managing the disputing process in the
company toward these objectives, not just to work on the individual cases
64 Id.
65 MOD Company Annual Litigation Report 9, in Corporate Study, supra note 13.
66 Id.
67 See MOD Company Annual Litigation Report, supra note 65, at 1-6.
68 See id. at 9.
69 See id. at 15.
70 See id.
71 See id. at tab 12.
72 See id. at tabs 3-12.
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that came to it. That meant taking on the role of active agents of change in
the corporation and rethinking their own assumptions about how lawyers go
about their work. 73
To begin with, the litigators completely redesigned the litigation
process in order to achieve earlier and less costly settlement. The crucial
step was to challenge the professional assumptions of attorneys about the
necessity of discovery. 74 The general counsel argued that "lawyers must be
put on an information diet," especially in a corporation where multimillion
dollar business decisions are based on considerable uncertainty. 75 However,
an information diet did not mean starvation, because it was important for
lawyers to be confident in their understanding of the issues they faced. The
challenge then was to redesign the ways to gather the needed information.
The solution adopted, according to the chief litigator at MOD, was
"early case analysis." According to him:
Early case analysis is not an inexpensive process. It means an early bubble
for the outside lawyers, but it is a one-time investment in their knowledge
about the case. Clients have typically not been willing to spend early to
learn about a case when hiring outside counsel. As a result they get into
discovery and learn about their own case when the other side is doing
depositions of their own people. We invest early in the case and interview
everyone here who knows about the dispute. Often as a result we know the
other side's case better than they do, and can forego expensive depositions
of the other side. We are in a better settlement posture early on.76
Heavy reliance on early case analysis was made possible by the fact that
this company, like the other five we studied, was far more often the
defendant than the plaintiff in litigation. Reliance on early case analysis
permitted careful assessments of the risks and benefits of varying legal and
dispute resolution options. It also led to careful monitoring of the use of
formal discovery. In addition, any decision to hire outside counsel that
might include costs beyond a certain amount had to be authorized, and an
ADR Case Evaluation Worksheet had to be completed and reviewed by an
ADR Coordinator. Thus, in-house resolution, careful risk analysis,
73 My account of the management of disputing at MOD organizes and rationalizes
a process that was much less explicitly planned and organized. Rather the features of
this process grew over time through trial and error.
74 See the discussion of "informal discovery" in The Corporate Counsel Section of
the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 20, at 303-304.




avoidance of discovery, and use of ADR- almost always mediation-were
the working default options for the company lawyers.
Lawyers did not stop at reorganizing litigation and giving prominence
to early settlement. They also became leaders in moving dispute resolution
down deeper into the company. Some of this effort involved diagnosis of
patterns of disputing and efforts to change the corporate culture and the
incentives that produced disputes. Thus, one division was identified as
having a particularly strong tough guy culture that generated conflicts with
business customers. 77 In the context of strong management statements about
the importance of preserving business relationships, especially with
customers, lawyers worked closely with division managers to counsel and
train their personnel about dispute resolution with the objective-
successfully achieved--of reducing the numbers of lawsuits directed at that
business unit.
Instead of taking for granted the existing incentive systems that help to
encourage litigation, the lawyers took initiative in changing them. Before,
settlement dollars came out of a manager's budget, while attorney fees
were part of the general corporate overhead. This policy was altered so that
attorney fees of both inside and outside counsel were allocated to
managers' budgets, and as a result they were aware of and responsible for
the substantial transaction costs of legal action.78
The litigation lawyers also redesigned the way that disputes with small
dollar amounts were handled by business people. Litigators created a
system for gathering information to provide a basis for early settlement
discussions at the business level. As a result, a paralegal would put together
that information for managers. According to one of the litigators, "That
gets you back to dispute avoidance which is the most important thing that
we do." 79
Aware of the problems of personal ego and emotional investment in
disputes and the barriers they posed to resolution, lawyers created new
roles in the disputing process-that of independent advisors who assisted in
assessing the dispute, the company's interests, and possible outcomes.
These "wise advisors" were high level people without direct responsibility
for the area or product in dispute. Their presence allowed the lawyers to
depersonalize disputes and promote reasonable and cost-effective outcomes
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All of these changes together amounted to a systematic effort to manage
disputing at MOD. Just as important were the choices made about how
disputes should be managed. Here, in the context of corporate emphasis on
speed and cost, the disputing managers adopted what they called "ADR or
mediation principles" 81 as the framework for thinking about disputes. The
lawyers employed these principles themselves in analyzing potential or
actual disputes. They would examine the relationship with the other party
as well as the other party's needs and interests, and explore ways of
moving forward with interest-based negotiation. At the same time, they did
a more conventional "risk analysis," assessing likely litigation costs and the
probabilities of varying legal outcomes. Sometimes the result of these
analyses would be a summary judgment motion, sometimes a negotiation
strategy, and sometimes a proposal to mediate.
The dispute managers also encouraged business people to learn and
adopt the same framework by focusing self-consciously on the needs and
interests of the other party in seeking resolution, not only on their own
positions. For example, one business manager told the story of a problem
that never reached the legal staff when the company faced termination of a
long-term relationship with an individually-owned business that provided a
needed service.
I was involved, but felt that I did not have the appropriate local knowledge
or personality to deal with this individual. I chose a company man from
another part of the country who had no previous contact with him-a fresh
face-but who was familiar with the territory and people like this
individual. He knew the breed and style. This company man met with me
and talked with people who had dealt with this individual on other matters.
Along with other company people, our representative worked out a
strategy and approach. They examined how they had dealt with him in the
past, where it had gone wrong, and how they could prevent problems in
the future. Then our representative jawboned with him over the phone and
then flew out to meet with him in person. As a result we paid less money
than demanded, maintained our access to his services, and improved our
relationship. 82
This story provides a good example of "case assessment" at an early stage
and of the use of "mediation principles" to arrive at a settlement without
litigation or mediation.
81 See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing MOD's use of "mediation
principles").
82 Corporate Study, supra note 13.
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In this company, thus, we see that the introduction of mediation helped
to provide a perspective on disputes that guided the assessment,
reorganization, and rationalization of the way that MOD managed disputing
generally. It was these changes in combination, however, not the
introduction of formal mediation alone, that appear to have altered the costs
and timing of disputes for this company and the quality of outcomes. The
lawyers at MOD went well beyond the more typical, reactive, and case-
centered roles of other corporate counsel by taking on leadership as
managers of the disputing process.
In doing so, these litigators had to overcome common concerns about
both corporate policy and about their roles as lawyers. The most difficult of
these appeared to be the perception that a company or a lawyer was an
"easy target" if it or he was disposed to settling cases. The general counsel
of MOD denied that his company had a "target reputation" but worried
that some in the company thought it did. Those managers needed to be
reminded, he later observed, that the commitment to ADR was a
commitment to efficiency and that it benefited all to engage in it. "But," he
went on, "only up to a certain point. If you push too far, we will litigate
and bury you." 83 The heavy reliance on mediation was thus placed in the
context of a tough-minded approach to defending corporate interests.
It appears that MOD's litigators thus embraced mediation principles
and widened their roles by blending their commitment to mediation
principles and to their broader roles as managers of disputing with more
conventional roles as vigorous advocates for their clients. Their ability to
do so suggests that the contrast between an "adversarial culture" and one
of commitment to interest-based settlement does not stand as polar
opposites but may be imaginatively integrated.8 4 In integrating these roles
and perspectives, the litigators at MOD understand their work in relation to
the larger interests of the company in good business relationships,
efficiency and timeliness of work completion, and cost saving. As the
general counsel put it:
Our record is one of being tough on high principle cases. But we are not
dealing with rights usually but rather with interest determinations. Our
disputes are almost all as defendants with businesses that are in continuing
83 Id.
84 This distinction plays a central role in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 34.
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relationships with us that we should be seeking to continue not to
rupture. 85
In retrospect the litigators acknowledged that they had to be pushed to
redefine their widened roles and to think differently about how to practice
law. According to the general counsel, "I can't think of an initiative that
was harder to sell. Lawyers generally were resistant to the spread of ADR
in the company."'86 The chief litigator reflected this view: "I came to ADR
dishonestly and reluctantly," and in doing so, he says, he had not
abandoned what he described as his "litigator's personality." 87 "I love
litigation. I love depositions. But ADR demands new skills, and I love it
too. One of the reasons is that we can advocate in ADR. We litigate like
hell in caucuses, but we are very polite in setting mediation up and when
the other parties are present." 88 The vigorous efforts to advance the
broadly understood interests of their client company have shaped their
tough-minded approach to mediation.
A story told of a mediation in one civil suit the company was defending
illustrates that approach, even though it draws us away from our focus on
business-to-business disputes. 89 The mediation took place in a spot distant
from their corporate headquarters. The company was represented by three
lawyers and one company officer, and the plaintiff was represented by
several attorneys. According to a company litigator:
We requested mediation. We had to do a lot of investigation [of our
own employees] first because there were lots of situation
witnesses.... Our employee who was responsible for the harm was no
longer with us.
[In the mediation] the plaintiff made a statement to start with. There
was extreme emotionality and feelings were expressed. We knew that
people had to ventilate and yell and scream. We immediately focused
discussion on damages, not on liability because we did not want to upset
the plaintiff by telling him that we thought he was wrong or untruthful or
hadn't suffered. It would have upset the plaintiff, and his lawyers were
very aggressive. I don't want to tell the man that he is wrong. He is very
angry and thinking of millions of dollars in the abstract for damages. We








had someone there with us who spoke Spanish, and we were as happy to
have the other side talking in Spanish or English. We didn't want to make
language an issue.
On damages, we had to get the numbers down to where they made
sense. During the mediation we made calls to our home office and did a
LEXIS search to check on the reasonableness of damages. To begin with
we had told them that there is a statutory cap to damages in this
jurisdiction, so when you make a demand, it had better be less. We pulled
from LEXIS the legislative history of the statute, and established that was
the field to the satisfaction of the lawyers. They accepted that finally.
Then we told them that "we are interested in working this out with you."
About three in the morning we got close enough to make a deal and
sign an agreement. We wanted to sign it there, not let people have second
thoughts or begin to argue about the commas. That is our general practice
in mediation. We like to do it there so we bring along a computer and
draft the agreement and do changes there on the computer. 90
What we see in this account is a blend between attentiveness on the part
of MOD's lawyers to the needs and interests of the other party, a
commitment to interest-based bargaining, a sophisticated awareness of
mediation process, and a powerful sense of the interests of their client
company in the context of the law. In order to advance the interests of their
client, they added a willingness to "listen, synthesize, and empathize" to
their approach to the dispute without abandoning their willingness to
"argue, criticize, and persuade." 91
B. Dealing with Disputes One-by-One at Other Companies
The picture at MOD, then, is of systematic approaches to managing
disputing in the context of "mediation principles" along with aggressive
efforts to protect the company and to advance a clear set of corporate
objectives focused on speedy and low-cost settlement and preserved
business relationships. This picture differs in degree but not in kind from
the one that emerges in the other five companies that we studied. Among
these companies several used mediation in significant numbers of cases,
and all were concerned about controlling litigation costs and had taken
some steps to do so. The differences had to do in part with the extent of the
efforts and the degree of coordination of those efforts. But most crucially,
the differences had to do with the willingness at MOD to monitor results
90 Corporate Study, supra note 13.
91 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 36.
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and to manage disputing generally and litigation particularly toward
reduced time and costs at all points in the disputing process and clear self-
awareness at MOD about employing mediation principles early in assessing
disputes and making strategic choices about how to handle them.
The similarities across the companies were apparent. For example, one
of them had a president who was taking a visible leadership role in
advocating improved relationships with customers and early resolution of
disputes. However, the lawyers in that company had not embraced
mediation or self-consciously altered their approaches to early negotiation
and appeared to maintain their conventional roles as case-by-case
counselors rather than as managers of disputing with clear organizational
goals to achieve. In another company, the use of ADR generally and
mediation in particular was strongly embraced but in the context of a
"scrappy" corporate culture and unchanged assumptions about the use of
formal discovery and the importance of early resolution. In these other five
corporations it appeared that disputes took longer to settle and did so at a
higher cost both to relationships and to company budgets, although there
was also variability among these companies.
V. CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT THE LIMITS AND
PROMISE OF MEDIATION
This study of variations in the ways that corporations approach conflict
with other businesses highlights the significant limitations of mediation by
itself in affecting the costs, timing, and even the quality of dispute
outcomes. Mediation does least when it is a tool used by lawyers and
parties proceeding with business as usual in handling disputes. It has the
prospect of doing most when it provides the rationale for other changes in
the ways that law is practiced and disputing is managed. Thus, the Rand
study findings, with which this Article began, may say less about mediation
per se and more about the uses to which mediation has been put in the
federal courts by the lawyers and clients whose cases appear there. In
thinking about the time, costs, and quality of dispute resolution, we need to
understand much more than whether or not disputes go through some ADR
process. We must know how parties organize and orient themselves to
utilize processes like mediation.
As we begin to see more clearly how businesses vary in the ways that
they manage disputes, we also can begin to add complexity to analyses of
competing philosophies of dispute resolution. Professor Menkel-Meadow,
for example, highlights the tensions between an adversarial culture of
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disputing and one focused on integrative negotiation. 92 She cautions in
particular against the co-optation and legalization of mediation by parties
and lawyers oriented to an adversarial approach who transform the
mediation process into a tool for strategic advantage in litigation, not for
imaginative and low cost settlement.93 In a way, our study of corporate
approaches to disputing provides strong evidence for these concerns. We
have seen that some companies adopted mediation, but changed little else in
their litigation and disputing strategies; for them mediation seemed to
produce far less by way of benefit in reduced costs, shorter duration of
disputes, and enhanced business relationships. In MOD, by contrast, the
use of mediation principles to shape the entire design of a system for
managing disputes within the company appears to have had significant
consequences for time, cost, and quality of dispute resolution. One view of
this comparison, then, could be of mediation co-opted (and in at least two
companies studied, unused) compared to mediation in "uncompromised"
form at MOD.
But that interpretation does not do full justice to the evidence. The
differences between MOD and the other companies are not between
companies and lawyers that cynically exploit mediation for litigation
advantage and those that do not. Instead, the primary differences among
these businesses relate to the way lawyers (litigators especially) understand
their roles and the degree to which businesses organize to manage
disputing. The lawyers at MOD are much more like their peers at other
companies than they are different. They conceive of themselves- and they
appear to be-aggressive advocates of their client's interests in the context
of the law. They employ mediation and principles of integrative bargaining
along with tough-minded litigation to advance those interests. They are
driven less by a commitment to a "warmer" way of disputing94 than by a
devotion to the much cooler goals of cost and time efficiency. But the
clarity of time and efficiency goals at MOD-goals often seen as
antithetical to the real meaning and value of mediation 95- have prompted
changes in both litigator roles and organizational approaches to disputing.
Thus, if we were to add to Professor Menkel-Meadow's insightful
analysis, it would be to say that the greatest threats to the effective use of
mediation to produce higher quality, more timely, and cost efficient
92 See id. at 18-19, 34.
93 See id.
94 See Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE
L.J. 1660, 1663-1664 (1985).
95 See sources cited supra note 8.
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resolution of disputes come not from an "adversarial culture" but from the
fact that frequently lawyers and their clients are trapped by the routines,
incentives, and traditional expectations of legal and business practice. What
frees lawyers and clients from these routines and their accompanying
expectations is not the use of mediation processes alone. Rather it is new
ways of thinking systematically about disputes that are made possible by
taking on new roles as managers of disputing with clear objectives to
manage toward and by self-consciously accepting mediation principles as
the default framework for assessing conflicts.
How far can we generalize these tentative conclusions from corporate
dispute resolution to the broader arena of civil litigation? Clearly not far.
There are many special features to this study. For example, large
corporations are what Professor Marc Galanter calls "repeat players" in
the world of disputing. 96 They, along with government agencies, can think
about managing disputing as a matter of policy and regular practice because
it is part of what they do regularly even if they typically treat the cases one-
by-one. Individual disputants generally do not have the same opportunity.
Their disputes are often one-time events and the focus for these parties is
on the case, not patterns of cases and policies and long-term objectives for
disputing. 97 Also, many parties are plaintiffs, not defendants. It is the
defense posture that may permit a company to forego significant formal
discovery because its own internal investigations may reveal the crucial
information. Companies are defendants in part because they are sued by
business customers with whom they often have an interest in maintaining
relationships, 98 but not all civil disputes are between parties where
sustaining relationships is a plausible goal.
96 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97 (1974).
97 For such cases, courts may be in the best position to manage disputing by setting
deadlines, encouraging effective limits of formal discovery, and facilitating efforts at
settlement. The relationships between case management and dispute resolution appear to
be close but need further examination. Rand, for example, examines judicial case
management in a separate report and finds "some promising strategies for reducing time
and costs while maintaining lawyers' sense of process fairness. See JAMES S. KAKALIK
ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT 91-93 (1996).
98 Lande reports that the business executives he studied reported that "they were
almost always defendants" in lawsuits. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A




Lawyers vary too. Inside counsel, for example, are in a very different
position than are law firm lawyers who work with corporations. The long-
term relationship of inside counsel with their clients permits them to think
strategically about policy and management of disputing. Their relationship
to their clients may help diminish for them the sense that they are exposed
to liability for negligent recommendations about settlement with anything
short of full information. 99 By contrast, to the degree that outside counsel
are engaged on a case-by-case basis, their focus will be on particular
disputes and more cautious advice about settlement. Although they are
changing and highly variable, the financial incentives vary between inside
counsel who must manage and explain their budgets and outside counsel
who feel they must produce results in particular cases. The general point is
that practice situations differ enormously across lawyers, and that these
practice situations can tell us much about the incentives and pressures that
produce different ways of understanding and employing mediation.
The challenge as we think about mediation both inside and outside of
the corporate context, thus, is to attend to the uses that parties and lawyers
make of mediation. Mediation can be a useful tool for resolving disputes in
ways that reduce costs, speed resolution, and improve quality of outcomes,
but, as the Rand report suggests to us, only if parties and lawyers employ it
to those ends.
99 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, 1 MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE § 4:03 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997).

